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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-UNCONSCIOUS PATIENT-LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE INSTRUMENTS-HosPITALS AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY-
Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291,338 A.2d 1 (1975).
In November 1967, defendant Dr. Somberg performed spinal sur-
gery, using general anesthetic, on the plaintiff. During the procedure a
jaw of the pituitary rongeur' he was using broke off and lodged in the
plaintiff's spine. The doctor terminated the operation after numerous
unsuccessful attempts to recover the fragment.2 Four months later he
retrieved the jaw in a second operation. The plaintiff suffered perma-
nent injuries3 for which he sought recovery from the following: (1) Dr.
Somberg for negligently causing the rongeur to break;4 (2) the hos-
pital in which the surgery was performed for negligently furnishing a
defective instrument; (3) the medical supply distributor which sold the
defective rongeur for breach of implied warranty; and (4) the rongeur
manufacturer in strict liability for manufacturing a defective product.5
The jury, on special interrogatories, found that plaintiff's injury was
not caused by the negligence of the doctor or of the hospital and that
the rongeur was not defective, i.e., it was fit for the ordinary purpose
for which it was sold and used.6 The court dismissed the claim as to
1. The pituitary rongeur is a forceps-like instrument used to remove soft tissue.
Brief for Defendant-Respondent Lawton Instrument Co. at 2, Anderson v. Somberg,
134 NJ. Super. 1, 338 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1973). Dr. Somberg was using the instru-
ment to remove disc material when it broke. 338 A.2d at 36.
2. Dr. Somberg spent 30 minutes attempting to retrieve the metal fragment before
terminating the operation. 338 A.2d at 36.
3. Dr. Somberg testified that the additional trauma of the second procedure caused
the plaintiff to develop drop foot syndrome, a nerve disorder which prevented him
from flexing his left foot in an upward direction. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Ander-
son at 6, Anderson v. Somberg, 134 NJ. Super. 1, 338 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1973).
4. The wisdom of defendant's decision to terminate the first operation was not
argued in the parties' briefs.
5. The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized plaintiff's action against Lawton
Instrument Company, the rongeur manufacturer, as a strict liability in tort claim.
67 NJ. 291, 338 A.2d 1, 3 (1975). The Appellate Division had previously described
the claim as "essentially predicated upon a breach of implied warranty of merchant-
ability." 134 N.J. Super. 1, 338 A.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 1973). See notes 40 & 66 and
accompanying text infra for commentary on the relationship between these two
theories.
6. The evidence identified two possible explanations for the break: (1) the instru-
ment was not defective when handed to Dr. Somberg and his subsequent improper
twisting caused it to break; or (2) the instrument was defective when handed to Dr.
Somberg and broke during proper use. 338 A.2d at 4.
Defendant hospital introduced evidence that the rongeur had been used for approxi-
mately four years, in as many as twenty different operations, and by as many as
twenty different surgeons. Pre-operative inspection of the instrument had been limited
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all defendants. 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appel-
late court's reversal8 and remanded for a new trial. 9 By so doing, the
to a visual examination. Id. at 3. Dr. Somberg testified that he tested mobility of the
handles and checked to see that the edges of the jaws met before inserting the rongeur
into the incision. Id. A metallurgist, called as a witness by the manufacturer, had
conducted a microscopic and spectrographic examination of the rongeur and fragment
in 1972. He testified that he discovered minute secondary cracks near the main frac-
ture point. He could not say when the cracks had developed or how they had formed
but he acknowledged that if the cracks were present prior to the operation they could
have substantially weakened the instrument in the critical area. Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant Anderson at 5, Anderson v. Somberg, 134 NJ. Super. I. 338 A.2d 35
(App. Div. 1973). He also offered the opinion that the failure was caused by a
twisting motion. 338 A.2d at 4. A surgeon, called by the plaintiff, testified that im-
properly twisting the rongeur during the operation might cause it to break but con-
ceded that there was no evidence that Dr. Somberg had done so. Brief for Defendant-
Respondent Somberg at 3. Anderson v. Somberg. 134 NJ. Super. I. 338 A.2d 35
(App. Div. 1973).
7. 338 A.2d at 37.
8. The Appellate Division had held:
[T] here has been a miscarriage of justice under the law requiring a new trial.
The inescapable facts are that plaintiff suffered injuries while unconscious during
surgery from an occurrence which by itself bespeaks liability on the part of one
or more of the defendants ...
Reason and common sense dictate that the jury additionally should be charged
that under the peculiar circumstances of this case the occurrence itself indicates
liability on the part of one or more of the defendants, and that the burden should
be shifted to defendants as they are most likely to possess knowledge of the cause
of the accident. Each defendant has the duty to come forward with explanatory
evidence.
338 A.2d at 37 (citations omitted).
9. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). In the
petition for writ of certiorari petitioners contended that the supreme court's decision
denied them due process and equal protection of the law. Defendants asserted that
the order to return a verdict against at least one defendant constituted an arbitrary
taking of property in the amount of the verdict, in violation of the 14th amendment.
According to petitioners, the due process violation lay in the deprivation of the pe-
titioners' right to a fair trial. " 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. . . . [O] ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.' Re [sic] Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 'Arbitrary
action is not due process.' Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir.
1955).'" Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 5-7, Anderson v. Somberg, 423 U.S. 929
(1975). Neither source is persuasive authority for the point. Murchison struck down
the practice of allowing a state judge to serve the investigative function of a "one-man
grand jury" and to try the persons accused as a result of his investigations. The ma-
jority said that "fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let prose-
cuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer." 349 U.S. at 137. It is clear
that the majority's primary concern was for the predispositions which the judge
brought to the trial, not the arbitrariness of his decision. There was no showing that
the appellate tribunals in Anderson possessed the biases which the judge in Murchison
developed when serving his grand juror's function. Rudder, on the other hand. dealt
with the arbitrary eviction of a tenant from governmental housing. In that case the
court said that "the government as landlord is still the government. It must not act
arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process
of law." 226 F.2d at 53. The government's duties as landlord have little relevance to
a judge's duty to conduct a fair and impartial trial.
Petitioners' due process argument was a tenuous one. They were not deprived of
notice or opportunity to be heard; they had had sufficient opportunity to present their
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supreme court made two significant changes in the state's prevailing
tort law. First, the court10 held that the jury should have been in-
structed that the burden of proving nonculpability was on the defend-
ants. 1 Second, and more importantly, the plurality, over a strenuous
dissent, 12 held that under such circumstances at least one defendant
most favorable evidence. It would be stretching to say that they were deprived of
"fundamental rights," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 310 (1937), or that the judges'
instruction "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 392 U.S. 165 (1952). Pe-
titioners' argument had to rest simply on the arbitrariness with which a judge may
make a decision to apply the Anderson rule. To rule for the petitioners would suggest
that judgments on the pleadings, judgments n.o.v., and orders for a new trial suffer
from the same due process defect. It was unlikely that the court would compromise
the utility of these judicial prerogatives by sustaining the allegation that a judge's
decision was an arbitrary denial of due process.
Petitioners' second argument was that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
denied them equal protection of the laws. They contended that the instruction that at
least one defendant must be found liable constituted an unreasonable classification,
bearing an irrational relationship to an illegitimate purpose. Petitioners' Brief for
Certiorari at 9, Anderson v. Somberg, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). The unreasonable classi-
fication lay in the statement that the defendants were the only ones who could be
liable to the plaintiff when in fact numerous other unjoined parties had also used the
instrument. Id. The illegitimate objective lay in the imposition of liability without
fault, in contravention of "the heart of New Jersey tort law." Id.
Petitioners' equal protection argument was even more tenuous than their due
process argument. Strict liability continues to grow as a legitimate and proper means
for imposing liability. Also, it appears that the New Jersey Supreme Court's action
would be subject to the deferential means-end review of "old equal protection" cases
rather than the stricter scrutiny given to matters dealing with fundamental rights and
suspect classifications. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
657-897 (9th ed. 1975). The deferential review typically given to "old equal pro-
tection" cases readily (even inferentially) discovers legitimate ends and routinely finds
a rational relationship between the means and ends. It is highly unlikely that the
Supreme Court would strike down the classification in Anderson-type cases if subjected
to this form of review. To do so would jeopardize the workability of such rules as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which gives the trial judge the discretion to decide
when a party is necessary and indispensable to the progress of the suit.
10. Two justices joined in Justice Pashman's majority opinion. One justice con-
curred in the result on the basis of the Appellate Division's majority opinion, which
shifted the burden of proof to the defendants but did not take the additional step of
requiring that at least one defendant be found liable. Two justices joined in Justice
Mountain's dissent. 338 A.2d at 8, 12.
11. The court noted the following conditions in determining the appropriateness
of such an instruction: (1) all defendants who owed the plaintiff a duty of care or to
provide a safe product were before the court; (2) the plaintiff was unconscious and
could not have been contributorily negligent; and (3) the plaintiff suffered an ad-
mitted mishap, not reasonably foreseeable, and unrelated to the scope of surgery.
338 A.2d at 7.
12. Justice Mountain articulated four reasons for dissenting. First, and most im-
portant, he was unwilling to accept the majority's premise that "each and every person
who may have brought about the imperfection in the surgical instrument or who may
have caused the injury by its misuse is before the court .... 338 A.2d at 9. He con-
ceded that the majority's assumption might be acceptable if the hospital had an
absolute duty to provide defect-free surgical instruments. He noted, however, that
"the state of the law in New Jersey . . . remains open as to whether strict liability in
tort might be available against the hospital .... Id. at 10 n. 3. Second, he argued
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could not sustain his burden of proof and must be found liable. 13
Together these changes represent the most substantial recent extension
of medical malpractice liability in the country.
This note will examine the Anderson decision and identify the prac-
tical and theoretical implications of the court's two holdings. It will
also recommend that the holdings of the Anderson court not be fol-
lowed in other states, but that courts instead impose a duty on de-
fendants to exculpate themselves, and extend strict liability theory to
hospitals which provide defective medical instruments which injure
innocent plaintiffs.
I. THE ANDERSON RATIONALE
A. Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur Theory in New Jersey14
Traditionally, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine has been given one of
three procedural effects. The first permits the jury to infer negligence
that the majority's adaptations of res ipsa loquitur leave the defendants with con-
siderably more than an obligation to explain their conduct and lack of fault. He
described them as members "of a group who must collectively, among themselves,
play a game of sauve qui pett [roughly translated: each man for himself]-and play
it for rather high stakes." Id. at 11. Third, he questioned shifting the burden of proof
to the defendants in strict liability actions, as he believed the majority had done, be-
cause precedent did not support such a change. Id. at 10 n.4. Finally, he identified a
potential conflict for jurors which arises from instructions to arrive at a verdict by a
preponderance of the evidence and to find one or more of the defendants liable. He
contended that this "removes from the case any semblance of rationality." Id. at 12.
13. Id. at 7. The court continued as follows:
The judge may grant any motion bearing in mind that the plaintiff must recover
a verdict against at least one defendant. . . . If only one defendant remains by
reason of the court's action, then, in fact, the judge is directing a verdict against
that defendant.
Id. The last sentence suggests that the court would be willing to apply both Anderson
holdings to an action against a single defendant. In such a case the defendant would
be found strictly liable upon a showing that (1) the plaintiff was injured in an un-
forseeable fashion while unconscious, and (2) no other defendants owed the plaintiff
a duty of care or a duty to provide a safe product. Imposition of strict liability under
these circumstances would be a major departure from prevailing strict liability theory.
See Part 111-C infra.
14. The Anderson court did not attach a res ipsa loquitur label to its holding, but
its analysis suggests it relied on res ipsa theory in reaching its conclusion. The court
mentioned that recent modifications of the doctrine have been labeled "akin to res ipsa
loquitur" by the New Jersey Supreme Court and "conditional res ipsa loquitur" by
the California Supreme Court. Id. at 5. See NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co.,
59 N.J. 274, 281 A.2d 793, 798 (1971); Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d
154, 397 P.2d 161, 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581 (1965) (Traynor, C.J., concurring
and dissenting). One commentator has referred to a California modification of the
doctrine as "California res ipsa." According to that writer:
The function of California res ipsa is to obviate the basic requirement that the
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from purely circumstantial evidence. 15 Under this approach, res ipsa
is merely a rule of circumstantial evidence which insures that the
plaintiff's case will go to the jury, i.e., the plaintiff will not be non-
suited.16 The remaining two procedural effects result in the imposition
of a greater procedural disadvantage upon certain defendants.' 7 This
is done by having the court instruct the jury either that a presumption
of negligence has arisen or, less frequently, that the burden of proof
has shifted to the defendant. 18
plaintiff prove by direct or opinion evidence that a negligent act or omission oc-
curred and that the injury resulted therefrom. California res ipsa is predicated on
the theory that, under the facts of the case, the patient's injuries might be the
result of some unknown malpractice. . . . California res ipsa reasons backwards
from an unintended and undesired result to the existence of malpractice. The in-
jury itself is evidence of negligence. The result may be, and often is, liability
without fault.
Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res lpsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1043,
1053 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Adamson]. Perhaps it would be appropriate to call
the two-part Anderson holding "New Jersey res ipsa."
15. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 228-29 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. See, e.g., Gould v. Winokur, 98 NJ. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916 (L. Div.
1968), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38 (App. Div. 1969); Sanzari v. Rosen-
feld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961); cf. note 27 and accompanying text infra.
16. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 19.11, at 1099 (1956).
17. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 228. The doctrine is most frequently used for the
purpose when the defendant has assumed a special responsibility for the plaintiff
(id. at 230. See generally NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59 NJ. 274, 281
A.2d 793 (1971)); or when the defendant has exclusive control of the cause of the
injury (PROSSER, supra note 15, at 230. See generally Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp.,
120 N.J. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363, 365 (App. Div. 1972)); or when the defendant
has superior information or opportunity to obtain evidence of the cause of the acci-
dent (PROSSER, supra note 15, at 230. See generally Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, 26
NJ. 595, 141 A.2d 301 (1958) and Jackson v. Magnavox Corp., 116 N.J. Super. 1,
280 A.2d 692, 696 (1971)).
18. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 16, at 1100-03. The theoretical difference
between the permissible inference and presumption (also described as shifting the
burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant) theories is that the
former does not entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict if the defendant offers no
explanation for his behavior. When the plaintiff is aided by a presumption of negli-
gence, however, he is entitled to a directed verdict if the defendant presents no de-
fense or if his explanation is so inadequate as not to rebut the presumption of negli-
gence. The theory which shifts the burden of proving nonculpability to the defendant
differs from the presumption theory only when the jury finds the probabilities of
negligence and nonnegligence to be equal. When this occurs, in cases in which the
burden of proof has shifted, the plaintiff must prevail because the defendant has not
proved his nonculpability by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
There is little practical difference among these three theories. Harper and James
write as follows:
In most of these cases the only serious obstacle to plaintiff's recovery is the pos-
sibility that he may not make out a res ipsa case in the first place. If he does, it
will make little practical difference to him which of the competing theories the
court has adopted. The only serious obstacles then would arise from a convincing
meritorious defense, or the danger of reversal on appeal. Of course the latter
danger may be considerable where the decisions in a jurisdiction are in con-
fusion-a state of things which is far more of an obstacle to plaintiffs than the
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Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court's 1971 decision in NOPCO
Chemical Division v. Blaw-Knox Co.19 New Jersey was a "permis-
sible inference" jurisdiction. This meant that in New Jersey the appli-
cation of res ipsa permitted the jury to draw an inference of a defend-
ant's negligence but did not require it to do So. 20 In NOPCO, how-
ever, the court significantly modified res ipsa theory by extending it to
multiple defendants and by shifting the burden of going forward with
the evidence to the multiple defendants. 21
The extension of res ipsa theory to multiple defendants appears to
violate the traditional res ipsa requirement that the defendant be in
exclusive control of the instrumentality which caused the plaintiffs
injury.22 In many cases involving multiple defendants, however, the
plaintiff can prove damages and suggest that one of the defendants
has breached his duty, but cannot identify the responsible party. In
these situations the plaintiff cannot make out a preponderant case
against any individual defendant. 23 As a result, under the traditional
res ipsa permissible inference theory, as long as the negligent party
and cause of the accident are matters of speculation, or the probabili-
ties are at best equally balanced, the court must direct a verdict for
adoption of any one of the competing rules would be.
Id. See also Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643.
644-45 (1950) (criticizing academic discussions of the procedural effect of res ipsa
loquitur); Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, I U. CHI. L. REV. 519
(1934).
Because res ipsa is contrary to the basic notion that a plaintiff must prove liability
by a preponderance of the evidence, courts have restricted its application to limited
fact patterns. According to traditional res ipsa theory, three conditions must exist
before the doctrine can be applied: (1) normally the event would not have occurred
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the cause of the accident was within the
exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the event was not caused by the con-
tributory negligence or voluntary action of the plaintiff. PROSSER, supra note 15, at
214. Some courts have added a fourth condition, that the defendant be in a better
position than the plaintiff to provide a true explanation of the accident. Prosser
asserts, however, that the inference of negligence should not be denied simply because
the defendant knew nothing of what had happened. Conversely, the inference should
not arise from a simple showing that the defendant knew more about the accident
than the plaintiff. Id. at 215.
19. 59 N.J. 274, 281 A.2d 793 (1971) (buyer of heavy machinery sued manu-
facturer, carriers, and bailees for damages inflicted on the machinery before reaching
the buyer).
20. See, e.g., Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961); Gould v.
Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super.
329, 250 A.2d 38 (App. Div. 1969).
21. 281 A.2d at 798. The Anderson court supported these adaptations because the
defendants individually owed the plaintiff a duty, had superior knowledge of the acci-
dent, and each could have been liable for the loss. 338 A.2d at 5-6.
22. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 223. See note 18 supra.
23. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 221.
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the defendants. 24 In such circumstances multiple defendants have little
incentive to explain their behavior. The court can discourage this
"conspiracy of silence"2 5 by shifting the burden of going forward with
the evidence to the defendants, as the New Jersey court did in
NOPCO, or by creating a presumption of negligence. In this way the
defendants are compelled to offer explanations of their conduct or to
lose to plaintidff's motion for a directed verdict.
A year after the NOPCO decision, the appellate division failed to
apply the NOPCO rules to a medical malpractice action in Magner v.
Beth Israel Hospital.26 For the first time, however, it applied res ipsa
24. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 218, 241. The plaintiff who is aided by a permissible
inference of negligence can avoid dismissal at the close of the presentation of his case.
He cannot, however, prevail in a motion for a directed verdict when confronted with
multiple, unresponsive defendants. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. See also
Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916, 921 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd, 104
NJ. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38 (App. Div. 1969).
According to traditional tort law, in a negligence action the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached his duty,
that the defendant's conduct was the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury, and that the plaintiff suffered actual loss or damage as a result. PROSSER,
supra note 15, at 143. Although res ipsa theory may assist the plaintiff in proving the
defendant's breach by permitting an inference that he has not used reasonable care,
theoretically, the doctrine cannot be used to establish cause-in-fact. Thode, The Un-
conscious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a Healthy
Part of His Body?, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 [hereinafter cited as Thode]. See also
PROSSER, supra note 15, at 226. With one exception, the burden of proving causation
remains with the plaintiff. The one exception arises when "double fault and alternative
liability" are clearly present. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 243. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.
2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), is the famous illustration. In that case the two defendants
shot simultaneously in the direction of the plaintiff, injuring his eye. Only one of the
defendants' shots could have caused the injury but the plaintiff was unable to identify
the responsible party. The court wrote:
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would
flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a
requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants
becomes manifest. They are both wrong-doers-both negligent toward plaintiff.
They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the
plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can.
199 P.2d at 4. The distinction between shifting the burden of proving cause-in-fact
and shifting the burden of proving negligence (that the defendant breached his duty
to the plaintiff) becomes important in analyzing Anderson's departure from precedent
and the practical implications of the decision. See note 31 and accompanying text
infra.
25. This phrase refers to the near impossibility of getting medical experts to
testify against their colleagues, no matter how incompetent or negligent the medical
defendant may have been. This "conspiracy" not only permits the negligent party to
escape liability, but it does little to insure that behavior will be modified to avoid
similar accidents in the future. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957). See also Gould v. Winokur,
98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916, 923 (L. Div. 1968). See generally Adamson, supra
note 14; Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common Law
Innovations, 45 MINN. L. REV. 1019 (1961).
26. 120 NJ. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 NJ. 199,
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principles to a complex medical malpractice action requiring expert
medical testimony.27
B. Anderson's Departure from Precedent
The Anderson court departed from New Jersey precedent in three
significant ways. First, the court extended NOPCO by shifting the
burden of proving nonculpability to the defendants. 28 The court per-
ceived NOPCO not as shifting the burden of proof to the defendants
but merely as requiring an explanatory account from the defendants. 29
Presumably to elicit a more complete explanation and to further as-
sist the plaintiff, the Anderson court increased the defendants' burden
to one of presenting an exculpatory account. 3° As a result of this
299 A.2d 733 (1973) (plaintiff undergoing a surgical procedure for removal of a
mole or lesion injured by flash fire triggered by electric cauterizer used by defendant).
27. Id. Originally res ipsa theory was not used in medical malpractice actions.
Adamson, supra note 15. at 1043. It was felt that expert medical testimony, comple-
mented by res ipsa instructions, would prove too confusing for jurors. See, e.g.,
Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp.. 120 NJ. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363. 365 (App. Div.
1972), cert. denied, 622 N.J. 199, 299 A.2d 733 (1973). Beginning in the 1950's,
New Jersey courts recognized that this complexity need not exist in all malpractice
cases, and consequently adopted the "common knowledge" doctrine which provided
the procedural benefits of res ipsa without requiring expert medical testimony to es-
tablish the proper standard of care. This doctrine was applied in cases where negli-
gence was so clear that laymen could, in light of their common knowledge, conclude
that the medical defendant was not "acting with the care and skill normal to the
average member of the profession." Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J. Super. 67, 107 A.2d 825,
826 (App. Div. 1954). See also Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625
(1961). See generally I D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 439-42
(1969, Supp. 1975); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND.
L. REV. 549, 610 (1959), in T. ROADY & W. ANDERSEN, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 13,
74 (1960). One writer has said that the doctrine has been "primarily limited to 'sponge
cases,' cases in which a physician failed to take an x-ray, and cases of gross medical
misconduct." Note, 51 WASH. L. REV. 167, 184 (1975).
In the earlier case of Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916 (L. Div.
1968), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38 (App. Div. 1969), the court reviewed
the difference between the res ipsa loquitur and "common knowledge" doctrines but
stopped short of allowing expert testimony to lay a foundation for res ipsa in cases
where the jury does not possess the requisite knowledge. New Jersey's prerequisites
for applying the res ipsa doctrine to malpractice actions generally conform to the
usual rules. See note 18 supra.
28. The court wrote:
We now hold that a mere shift in the burden of going forward, as adopted in
NOPCO, is insufficient. For this particular type of case, an equitable alignment
of duties owed plaintiff requires that not only the burden of going forward shift
to defendants, but the actual burden of proof as well.
338 A.2d at 6.
29. Id.
30. See Part II-A infra for a discussion of the practical implications of requiring
an exculpatory account.
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change defendants must now prove their nonculpability by a prepon-
derance of the evidence or be found liable.31
Anderson's second, and most significant, departure from precedent
was its requirement that the jury be instructed to find at least one de-
fendant liable. The court noted:32
31. Although the burden-of-proof holding in Anderson was new law in New Jersey
there was supporting precedent in California. In Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31
Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947), the California Supreme Court, despite a seemingly
direct disclaimer, effectively shifted the burden of proving nonculpability to the de-
fendant hospital and physician. 188 P.2d at 14. Quoting from Bourguignon v. Penin-
sular Ry. Co., 40 Cal. App. 689, 181 P. 669 (1919), the Dierman court said:
[W] here the accident is of such a character that it speaks for itself, as it did in
this case,... the defendant will not be held blameless, except upon a showing
either (1) of satisfactory explanation of the accident; that is, an affirmative show-
ing of a definite cause for the accident in which cause no element of negligence
on the part of the defendant inheres; or (2) of such care in all possible respects
as necessarily to lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have happened
from want of care, but must have been due to some unpreventable cause, al-
though the exact cause is unknown:
188 P.2d at 15. Justice Traynor's dissent correctly suggested that the majority de-
manded considerably more than Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944), which permitted the plaintiff to rely on the res ipsa doctrine to avoid a non-
suit and required the defendants to give an "initial explanation" of the accident and
their conduct. 154 P.2d at 690. Traynor believed that the Dierman majority required
that the defendant prove (1) he was not negligent, and (2) the actual cause of the
accident. Only by proving both elements could he be adjudged free from fault. 188
P.2d at 17. In so doing, the court created more than a permissible inference or a pre-
sumption of negligence. California has since retreated from the Dierman rule in
multiple defendant actions. See Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58
Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967); Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509,
305 P.2d 36 (1956); Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161,
41 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1965). In Clark, for example, the supreme court ignored Dierman
and reverted to Ybarra reasoning. In so doing the court resurrected the language of
"permissible inferences" and "initial explanations." The majority, however, continued
as follows:
To avoid the inference as a matter of law an individual doctor must go beyond
showing that it was unlikely or not probable he was negligent and must establish
that he is free from negligence by evidence which cannot be rationally disbelieved.
426 P.2d at 533 (emphasis in original). This statement suggests that a medical de-
fendant can avoid liability by proving that he has conformed to the proper standard
of care. Under the discarded Dierman rule, and now under Anderson, on the other
hand, the defendant must also establish both the cause for the accident and his free-
dom from contribution to it in order to avoid liability.
The Anderson majority also cites Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1
(1948), as authority for shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. Summers is
easily distinguishable and clearly inapposite. As the court correctly identified, Summers
involved two clearly negligent parties upon whom the California court placed the
burden of proving the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. Although the defendants
were acting independently the court said they were joint tortfeasors and would remain
so until one of them proved that his negligence did not cause the injury. 199 P.2d at
4; see note 24 supra. None of the four Anderson defendants was clearly negligent and
their conduct, when compared to that in Summers v. Tice, does not justify shifting
the burden of proving causation to the defendants.
32. 338 A.2d at 7 (footnote omitted).
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[A] t the close of all the evidence, no reasonable suggestion had been
offered that the occurrence could have arisen because of plaintiff's
contributory negligence, or some act of nature; that is, there was no
explanation for the occurrence in the case save for negligence, or de-
fect on the part of someone connected with the manufacture, handling,
or use of the instrument. . . . Since all parties had been joined who
could reasonably have been connected with that negligence or defect,
it was clear that one of those parties was liable, and at least one could
not succeed in his proofs.
This rationale is both surprising and confusing. On its face, the state-
ment resembles a simple conclusion that liability existed as a matter of
law, i.e., reasonable men could not differ in the conclusion that lia-
bility existed. Such a conclusion, however, is normally reserved for
situations where the responsible party can be identified. Absent a
clearly negligent act by the physician or a demonstrable defect in the
instrument, negligence can be found as a matter of law only if the
hospital or doctor had a duty to conduct microscopic examinations of
surgical instruments to discover minute defects. The ease with which
one can reconstruct a reasonable, indeed probable, explanation for
the injury33 further undermines the negligence as a matter of law con-
clusion and, on the other hand, supports the contention that the court
actually attempted to extend strict liability theory, albeit in an awk-
ward fashion, to hospitals and physicians.3 4
Anderson's third departure from precedent was its application of
res ipsa principles to alternative theories of liability. The court stated
that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine has "been expanded to embrace
cases where the negligence cause was not the only or most probable
theory in the case, but where the alternate theories of liability ac-
counted for the only possible causes of injury. '35 The cases to which
the court refers, however, provide little if any support for this state-
ment.36 Thus, Anderson is the first New Jersey case in which "social
33. The most logical explanation of the plaintiff's injury is that: (1) the rongeur
was delivered defect-free to the hospital; (2) during one or more of the intermediate
operations the instrument was mishandled; (3) as a result of this mishandling
(or proper handling and general fatigue) the invisible secondary crack developed;
(4) the weakened instrument was handed to Dr. Somberg and broke during the
operation.
34. See Part I-B infra.
35. 338 A.2d at 5.
36. The Anderson court cites three California cases, one New Jersey case, and
one New Jersey dissenting opinion to support this statement. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d
at 5. Two of the three California cases involved only negligence or malpractice ac-
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policy res ipsa" has been extended to breach of warranty/strict liability
actions. 37
II. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ANDERSON
A. Shifting the Burden of Proof to the Defendants
Under Anderson, in order to avoid liability for negligence a de-
fendant must exculpate himself by a preponderance of the evidence. If
traditional negligence principles were applicable his exculpatory ac-
count could take one of two forms. The defendant could prove either
(1) that he had conformed to the proper standard of care, or (2) that
his conduct was neither the cause-in-fact nor the proximate cause of
tions. Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947) (plaintiff
injured when cauterizing spark caused explosion of contaminated nitrous oxide or
ether); Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1965) (plaintiff suffered cardiac arrest when anesthetized for elective eye sur-
gery). In Diermnan four possible reasons were given for the injury-producing explo-
sion, one of which might have supported a strict liability claim against the supplier of
the nitrous oxide tanks. No such action was brought, however. In Burr v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 258 P.2d 58 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953), rev'd, 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268
P.2d 1041 (1954), negligence and breach of implied warranty actions were brought
against the manufacturer of a crop spray. It is not clear from the opinion whether the
court's comments about the res ipsa loquitur doctrine apply to the breach of warranty
action as well as the negligence action. NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59
NJ. 274, 281 A.2d 793 (1971) (action against multiple defendants for in-transit
damage to chemical drying equipment), provides little or no support for the Anderson
court's statement. The greatest support for the statement may be found in the ma-
jority opinion of Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, 42 NJ. 177,
199 A.2d 826 (1964). There the court seemed amenable to applying the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to the negligence and breach of implied warranty actions against
an abrasive disc manufacturer. 19,9 A.2d at 830.
37. In Corbin v. Camden Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 N.J. 425, 290 A.2d 441
(1972), the New Jersey Supreme Court did not find reversible error in the trial court's
charge that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applicable to a breach of warranty
(strict liability) claim against Coca-Cola Bottling Company. The court said:
To invoke the doctrine of res ipsa plaintiff need not altogether eliminate the pos-
sibility of other causes but only that their likelihood be so reduced that it is more
probable than not that, in the absence of an explanation to the contrary, the
cause of the defect was one for which the defendant is responsible.
While it has been said that the doctrine does not apply to breach of warranty
cases, United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1963),
under the circumstances here it may be said that in a broad sense the theory
underlying the doctrine of res ipsa does apply, i.e., the circumstances give rise
reasonably to an inference of a defect in the carton.
290 A.2d at 446-47 (citations omitted). It is clear the court was speaking of res ipsa
as a form of circumstantial evidence which permitted the jury to infer that a product
was defective. This is far different from using the doctrine as an instrument of public
policy which requires the defendant to rebut a presumption that a defect exists or
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product is not defective.
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plaintiff's injury. 38 Thus, under traditional principles, Dr. Somberg
and the defendant hospital could have avoided liability by proving
that the operation was consistent with generally accepted surgical
practices and that the instruments were inspected in accordance with
the proper standard of care. But in holding that under the circum-
stances at least one defendant must be found liable39 the Anderson
court abolished the alternative of avoiding liability by proving con-
formance with the proper standard of care. Moreover, at least one
defendant will be unable to exculpate himself by proving that his con-
duct was neither the cause-in-fact nor the proximate cause of the in-
jury.
The New Jersey courts have found little difference between strict
liability in tort and breach of warranty actions when brought by in-
jured consumers. 40 Thus, if the Anderson court had simply shifted the
burden of proof to the rongeur manufacturer and supply distributor
they could have avoided liability under either theory in one of three
ways. They could have proven that (1) the instrument was not defec-
tive, i.e., that it was reasonably fit for the purpose of removing disc
material; (2) the defect did not arise out of the design or manufacture
of the instrument or while the article was in their control; or (3) the
defect was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.4' Anderson's
second holding, however, indicates that a manufacturer or distributor
could be found liable, even if it had exculpated itself by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
Shifting the burden of proof to multiple medical defendants has
several practical advantages, foremost of which is the assurance of a
more complete presentation of the facts. Placing the burden of proof
on the defendants discourages "strategic silence." It insures that the
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict will be granted unless the de-
fendants offer satisfactory explanations. It also insures that the plain-
tiff will prevail when the defendant's liability and innocence appear
equally probable. In addition, shifting the burden of proof reduces the
38. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 143.
39. See Part 1I-B infra.
40. See notes 63-69 and accompanying text infra. See also Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879, 884 (L. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969), where the court stated that "[s] trict liability in tort
for harm caused by defective merchandise sold or supplied for a consideration is the
same cause of action as that asserted under the heading of warranty." 232 A.2d at 884.
41. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
992
Vo. 51: 981, 1976
Medical Malpractice-Defective Instruments
plaintiffs burden of discovering and proving unusually complex mat-
ters peculiarly within the defendants' expertise. 42 It also tends to sim-
plify jury instructions and minimize the danger of reversal on ap-
peal.43 Finally, the wisdom of simply shifting the burden of proof to the
defendants does not depend on the joinder of all defendants who
could possibly be liable. A defendant could avoid liability by showing
it is more probable than not that an unjoined party was responsible
for the injury. The practical advantages of shifting the burden of
proof far outweigh the theoretical inconsistencies of doing so. 44
B. Instructing the Jury That at Least One Defendant Must Be Found
Liable
1. The joinder problem
Instructing the jury that at least one defendant must be found liable
assures that the unconscious patient will be compensated for his in-
jury. Although this outcome has equitable appeal, it is not achieved
without substantial cost. First, this instruction could strain the state's
impleader provisions and increase drastically the complexity of litiga-
tion. Because the viability of the Anderson rule depends upon the
joinder of every party who is or may be liable for all or part of the
defendant's claim, joinder requirements must be liberally construed.
This suggests that a medical defendant's motion to serve a third party
complaint in an Anderson-like case should be readily granted. Be-
cause at least one defendant must be found liable the defendants will
have a strong interest in expanding the number of defendants from
which the jury can select the responsible party or parties. As a result,
strategic use of the third party practice provisions, and their liberal
interpretation, would generate more complex medical malpractice
cases.
The problem is complicated because the holding precludes sepa-
ration of trials. Under Anderson each defendant has a two-dimen-
sional burden of proof, one as against the plaintiff and the second as
42. See Adamson, supra note 14, at 1050.
43. See Louisell & Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 48 CALIF. L. Rv. 252, 261-62 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Louisell & Wil-
liams].
44. See notes 24 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
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against the other defendants. The jury's assessment of liability de-
pends on its evaluation of both dimensions of each defendant's case.
The jury must identify the defendant or defendants who provide the
least credible explanation for the cause of the accident and find him
liable. In order to make this determination, the jury must have an
opportunity to hear and compare each defendant's evidence. Separate
trials would cut off the jury's ability to evaluate the second dimension
of each defendant's proof.
The second difficulty is that the ultimate justice of the instruction
depends on the joinder of all defendants who could be liable to the
plaintiff. Unless the hospital has an absolute duty to discover all de-
fects in a surgical instrument 45 the plaintiff will have the nearly im-
possible task of identifying and joining all of the surgeons who had
previously used the instrument before he can claim the benefit of the
instruction. Moreover, once all the defendants have been joined the
trial judge will have the difficult task of deciding whether any defend-
ants should be dismissed. The defendants' memories are likely to be
faded and explanations of the cause of the break extremely incom-
plete and speculative. The problem might be compounded by the
availability of more than one rongeur in the hospital, in which case
the intermediate defendants will be hard pressed to identify the instru-
ment they actually used.
2. Theories of liability
The instruction that one or more defendants must be found liable
provides little or no incentive to modify surgical technique, instrument
inspection, or manufacturing practices. The court is short-sighted
when it says this instruction is merely a rule of evidence 46 to be em-
ployed in limited situations. 47 It is true that the rule does not alter the
manufacturer's and distributor's duty to provide a defect-free instru-
ment. Nor does it clearly state that doctors and hospitals should alter
the standards of care with which they treat patients. It does suggest,
however, that the jury may extend sub silentio the strict liability stan-
dard to both physicians and hospitals.
45. See note 12 supra.
46. 338 A.2d at 5.
47. See note I I supra for the court's articulation of the circumstances in which
the Anderson rule will be applied.
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Although the Anderson court totally abandoned caveat emptor lia-
bility, it did not identify the alternative theory upon which liability
should be based. The decision contains language descriptive of lia-
bility based upon fault but demands that the jury find at least one de-
fendant absolutely liable. This instruction is most dangerous to hospi-
tals and physicians who previously have been immune from strict lia-
bility actions. 48 Under Anderson the jury can imipose strict liability on
either of these parties by a process of elimination. More specifically,
the jury could believe that neither the doctor nor the hospital
breached its duty to the plaintiff but find either or both parties liable
because it believed the instrument was defect-free when delivered to
the hospital. This retention of negligence standards, with strict lia-
bility overtones, creates uncertainty as to the standard of care to
which physicians and hospitals must conform to avoid liability.
Furthermore, when the jury is honestly unable to identify a culp-
able defendant it is likely either to apportion damages equally among
all defendants or to return a verdict for nominal damages. Both re-
sponses would conform to the jury instructions, but neither would
have resulted under either the negligence theory or the strict liability
theory alone. Thus both theories have been altered in an effort to
allow the plaintiff to recover.
Ill. AN ALTERNATIVE TO ANDERSON: IMPOSE A
DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT TO EXCULPATE
HIMSELF AND EXTEND STRICT LIABILITY
THEORY TO HOSPITALS
A. Equity and the Negligence Action
The foreign-objects-in-unconscious-patient cases have been particu-
larly difficult for courts because of the apparent inequity of denying
compensation to an unconscious plaintiff who is injured by an object
left in him by a physician. In such cases the plaintiffs innocence is
complete; he has surrendered himself totally to those persons pro-
viding his care. The Anderson court recognized the injustice of
denying recovery but failed to deal forthrightly with the real barrier to
the plaintiffs recovery-the difficulty of negligence actions against
48. See Part II--C infra.
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the doctor and hospital. This oversight is apparent in the court's ov-
erly simplistic and erroneous statement that "[ t] his case resembles the
ordinary medical malpractice foreign-objects case, where the patient is
sewn up with a surgical tool or sponge inside." 49 The negligent failure
to recover all surgical sponges is a clear breach of the surgeon's duty
of care for which the plaintiff should be compensated. Failure to de-
tect a minute crack in an instrument, however, absent a duty to micro-
scopically inspect, is not analagous. The breach was not in inadver-
tently leaving the fragment in the patient; rather, if there was a
breach, it was in failing to discover the defect or incorrectly manipu-
lating the instrument.
As long as the hospital or physician is held to a reasonable standard
of care, the possibility exists that an unconscious patient will go un-
compensated. Because negligence theory has not previously required
that either defendant inspect surgical instruments for microscopic
cracks, they could both exercise reasonable care but overlook a de-
fect, not attributable to the manufacturer or distributor, which seri-
ously injures the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the plaintiff cannot
recover. The Anderson rationale provides a means for avoiding this
conclusion. Future patients and the future of the law, however, would
be better protected by imposing a duty on the defendants to exculpate
themselves and by extending strict liability to hospitals.
B. Medical Defendants Have a Duty To Exculpate Themselves
There are numerous reasons for employing the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine in malpractice actions where an unconscious patient is in-
jured.50 Doing so, however, introduces the confusion of permissible
inferences, presumptions, and shifting burdens. 51 It is possible to re-
tain the benefits and avoid the difficulties by abandoning the res ipsa
rationale and language. In its place the trial judge would charge the
jury in terms of the medical defendant's duty to explain untoward re-
49. 338 A.2d at 5.
50. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
51. See generally Louisell & Williams, supra note 43. See also Carpenter, The
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, I U. Cmi. L. REV. 519 (1934); Prosser, The Procedural
Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1936); Carpenter, The Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 166 (1937); Prosser, Res Ipsa
Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1937); Carpenter,
Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Rejoinder to Professor Prosser, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 467 (1937).
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suits of surgery.5 2 This duty can be derived from three sources. The
first is in the "special responsibility for the plaintiff's safety under-
taken by everyone concerned."5 3 Many common carrier cases reflect a
deliberate policy of requiring the defendants to explain or pay.54 Doc-
tors occupy a similar special responsibility toward their patients which
requires similar disclosure.55 The second source of defendant's duty to
explain is the code of medical ethics, which requires that a physician
render "to each [patient] a full measure of service and devotion." 56
Third, physicians have the duty of providing sufficient information to
permit a patient's informed consent to treatment. 57 They also must
inform a patient of a condition resulting from treatment which may
itself require further treatment.58 A physician should have a similar
duty to explain unanticipated complications resulting from surgery.
There are logical, practical, and theoretical advantages to the appli-
cation of duty principles. Such an approach would simplify jury in-
structions. The principle of duty is more readily understandable than
the subtle differences between permissible inferences, presumptions,
52. The change is essentially one of nomenclature, prompted primarily by the
confusion which res ipsa instructions generate in the minds of jurors. See note 9 and
accompanying text supra. A defendant with a duty to explain untoward results of
surgery would have the same task as a defendant to whom the burden of proof had
shifted. See Louisell & Williams, supra note 43, at 261-62, 269, in which the authors
support use of the res ipsa principle as a means of converting a moral duty to explain
into a legal one. See also Thode, supra note 24, and Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitor: Tabula
in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1950), in which the author writes: "It would
seem to be just that where plaintiff has submitted himself or his property to another,
the other should be under a duty to explain any resulting harm which would not
normally occur without negligence on the defendant's part." Id. at 646 (footnote
omitted).
53. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 223.
54. Id. at 223. See, e.g., NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59 NJ. 274, 281
A.2d 793 (1971) (buyer of heavy machinery sued manufacturer, carriers, and bailees
for damages inflicted on the machinery before reaching the buyer).
55. Thode, supra note 24, at 8.
56. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 1 (1957),
quoted in Louisell & Williams, supra note 43, at 253.
57. Thode, supra note 24, at 8. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237,
279 A.2d 116 (App. Div. 1971), modified, 62 NJ. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Kaplan
v. Haines, 96 NJ. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 NJ. 404,
241 A.2d 235 (1968). See also McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice,
55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1397-98 n. 5 (1967).
58. See Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 948 (E.D. Va. 1960) (physician who
had suspicion that he left a sponge in wound, but failed to reveal his suspicions to the
patient, was liable for negligence). But cf. Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d
422 (1950) (physician's failure to explain to patient upon his discharge from the
hospital that there was a nonunion of a fractured ankle was not itself malpractice).
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and shifting burdens of proof.59 Using duty principles also avoids the
theoretical error of using res ipsa to establish cause-in-fact. 60 The duty
to explain would not depend on the joinder of all possible defendants
or the exclusivity of a defendant's control over the instrumentality. 6'
Finally, a beneficial by-product could result from application of duty
principles: 62
It might well be that a rule requiring physicians frankly to face up to
an obligation to explain untoward results to the best of their ability
would produce a public psychology that would accord them a fairer,
even a more sympathetic hearing than that accorded under the cat and
mouse psychology of today's secrecy.
Thus, the application of duty principles would be preferable to em-
ploying the res ipsa rationale.
C. Extend Strict Liability Theory to Hospitals
The New Jersey Supreme Court spearheaded the rapid extension of
strict liability theory to the products liability field in the historic 1960
case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 63 In Henningsen the
court recognized an implied warranty of merchantability running
from the manufacturer to the consumer regardless of whether there
was privity of contract between them. 64 Five years later, in Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,65 the court refined its statement of strict
liability in tort theory and clarified its relationship to the contract
breach-of-warranty theory. 66 The court has since expanded the princi-
59. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra. See also Thode, supra note 24,
at 7.
60. Thode, supra note 24, at 2. See also Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1950); note 24 supra.
61. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
62. Louisell & Williams, supra note 43, at 268. The authors were arguing for a
shift in the burden of proof but the point is as valid when used to argue for replacing
res ipsa loquitur principles with duty principles.
63. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (plaintiff's wife was injured while driving
allegedly defective automobile, manufactured by defendant Chrysler Corporation,
shortly after its purchase from defendant Bloomfield Motors).
64. 161 A.2d at 84.
65. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (plaintiff purchaser of defective carpet suc-
ceeded in a strict liability action against the manufacturer).
66. According to the majority in Santor:
Under the strict liability in tort doctrine, as in the case of express or implied
warranty of fitness or merchantability, proof of the manufacturer's negligence in
the making or handling of the article is not required. If the article is defective,
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pies of these cases to include a used car dealer,67 a mass developer of
homes, 68 and a truck lessor.69
The court has not, however, extended strict liability theory to phy-
sicians or hospitals who supply defective medical equipment. In Ma-
grine v. Spector70 the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court dismissal of a strict liability action against a dentist for injuries
resulting from his use of a defective hypoderriic needle. The lower
court gave four reasons for the dismissal. First, the dentist neither cre-
ated the defect nor possessed a better capacity or expertise than the
plaintiff to control, inspect, or discover the defect. 71 Second, the de-
fendant was not involved in the sale of the product nor did he
promote its purchase; he merely provided services to the plaintiff.7 2
Third, although the court admitted that spreading the risk of loss may
i.e., not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold
and used, and the. defect arose out of the design or manufacture or while the
article was in the control of the manufacturer, and it proximately causes injury
or damage to the ultimate purchaser or reasonably expected consumer, liability
exists. Existence of the defect means violation of the representation implicit in
the presence of the article in the stream of trade that it is suitable for the general
purposes for which it is sold and for which such goods are generally appropriate.
207 A.2d at 313.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) describes the rules of strict
liability slightly differently. The section provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
67. Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 NJ. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974).
68. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
69. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965). See notes 76-78 and accompanying text infra.
70. 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (per curiam), aff'g 100 N.J. Super. 223,
241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'g Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 NJ. Super. 228, 227
A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. L. Div. 1967).
71. 227 A.2d at 543.
72. Id. In the court's words:
[T] he essence of the transaction between the retail seller and the consumer re-
lates to the article sold. The seller is in the business of supplying the product to
the consumer. It is that, and that alone, for which he is paid. A dentist or a phy-
sician offers, and is paid for, his professional services and skill. That is the
essence of the relationship between him and his patient.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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be desirable, it reasoned that the manufacturer, with his many cus-
tomers, was in a better position to insure against defects in his prod-
ucts than was the dentist with his relatively low volume of patients.7 3
Finally, the dentist did not know who manufactured or supplied the
needle. Consequently, the defendant was unable to implead either of
the two parties who were most likely responsible for the defect. 74
Although these objections may be appropriate to an action against
a physician they are not appropriate to an action against a hospital.
Hospital personnel are in a better position than either a physician or a
patient to control, inspect, and discover defects in reusable surgical
instruments. Operating-room personnel are present during the opera-
tion to observe an instrument's use and possible misuse.75 Likewise,
repeated sterilizations of the instruments would provide the opportu-
nity for responsible personnel to conduct close inspections of the in-
struments.
The role of a hospital includes more aspects of a sale than does pro-
fessional service by a physician or dentist. The sale-service distinction
is important because strict liability in tort and contract is applicable
only to the sale of a product and not to the rendering of a personal
service. That plaintiff Anderson's injury occurred during the "sale" of
a product is apparent from an analysis of Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Service.76 There the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a lessor of trucks may be found strictly liable for injuries
resulting from the use of its rental vehicles. There were two facts crit-
ical to the court's extension of strict liability to the lessor. First, the
73. Id. at 545-46. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Sone Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1329 (1966); Prosser, The Assault upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960);
Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.Jo 69; Brant, Medical Mal-
prtgctice Insurance: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 152
(1972). See also Comment, Congress Takes a Look at a No-Fault Proposal for
Medical Malpractice: Some Observations, 9 AKRON L. REV. 116 (1975), where the
author reports that the maximum annual premium for high risk medical professionals
across the continental United States ranges from $14,000 to $47,000. Id. at 116 n.2.
74. 227 A.2d at 546.
75. If, for example, the rongeur had been bent and then straightened by one of
the intermediate surgeons the attendant operating-room personnel would have been
forewarned of a potential defect. They should have the duty to discard that instrument.
76. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1969). Plaintiff Cintrone was a passenger in a
truck leased by his employer from the defendant when the brakes apparently failed.
causing the plaintiff's injury. Previous difficulty with the brakes had allegedly been
brought to the defendant's attention. The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's
warranty claim (which was the principal issue on appeal) and the jury had found for
the defendant on the plaintiff's negligence claim. 212 A.2d at 771-73.
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lessor was a bailor-for-hire. Revenue collection preserved the notion
of enterprise liability7 7 which justified extension of strict liability to
wholesalers and retailers. Second, "the customer was expected to, and
in fact must, rely ordinarily on the express or implied representation
of fitness for immediate use."'78 Both of these elements are present in
Anderson.
Like the truck lessor, the hospital seeks to recoup its investment in
equipment by charging a fee for the benefits that its instruments pro-
vide to the patient. Many times the patient must use the equipment
outside the hospital in order to realize its benefits.79 Other times, as
with surgical instruments, the hospital provides "products" in the form
of benefits to patients by making medical equipment available for pro-
fessional use. Second, the surgical patient is at least as vulnerable as
the lessee of a truck, for the patient also relies on the representation
that the equipment is fit for use. He has neither the authority, the oppor-
tunity, nor the expertise to inspect for defects.
The willingness to find a "sale" by a hospital was indicated in the
opinion of the Magrine trial court in its discussion of PerImutter v.
Beth David Hospital,80 a New York case which held that the de-
fendant hospital was not strictly liable to the plaintiff for giving blood
which contained a hepatitis strain. The Magrine court said: "It is
doubtful that New Jersey would follow Perlmutter, at least insofar as
77. See Justice Batter's dissent in Magrine v. Spector, 100 NJ. Super. 223, 241
A.2d 637, 642 (App. Div. 1968), where he states:
In Santor ... the court pointed out that the obligation is "an enterprise liability"
that does not depend upon "the intricacies of the law of sales" and that this
"strict liability in tort is not conditioned upon advertising to promote sales."
Cintrone . . . makes it clear that there is no reason to restrict the rule to sales
transactions. The obligation is implied in law, "as an incident of a transaction
because one party to the relationship is in a better position than the other to
know and control the condition of the chattel * * * and to distribute the losses
which may occur because of a dangerous condition the chattel possesses."
241 A.2d at 642 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). See generally P. EHREN-
ZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 2 (1951); Campbell, Enterprise Liability--An
Adjustment of Priorities, 10 FORUM 1231 (1975).
78. 45 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d at 777.
79. A much clearer case for imposing strict liability exists for those products the
hospital permits patients to take home. Examples include walking aids, prostheses,
braces, portable respirators, diagnostic/monitoring equipment, and other therapeutic
equipment. Frequently the hospital charges rental fees for such equipment. Under
these circumstances the hospital's liability as lessor should be the same as that of the
truck lessor in Cintrone. See note 76 supra.
80. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). In this case the New York Court of
Appeals said the defendant hospital was not liable under warranty theory because the
plaintiff had not been "sold" a transfusion of impure blood. The transaction was
characterized as a service rather than as a sale.
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it holds a 'sale' was not involved or that such description of the trans-
action is necessary to establish strict liability. . . . [T] he hospital in
Perlmutter was a supplier."8'
Furthermore, subsequent to Cintrone and Magrine, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to abandon the "essence"
test of Magrine.82 When the Magrine court applied the essence test to
the transaction between the dentist and the patient, the court found
that the dentist offered, in essence, a professional service rather than a
product. In a more recent case 83 the court indicated its willingness to
abandon the essence test in a hybrid sales-service transaction. 84 Thus,
for purposes of strict liability, hospitals no longer provide either a sale
or a service, but they provide both a sale and a service.
In Magrine the court said that the manufacturer, because of nu-
merous customers, was in a better position to distribute the risk of in-
jury than was the relatively low-volume dentist. This barrier to strict
liability recovery from the hospital does not apply in Anderson, how-
ever. St. James Hospital had 216 beds and admitted 8,025 patients
during 1974. Expenses for that year exceeded $7 million.85 The
volume of its business is sufficient to spread the risk of defective
equipment across large numbers of patients. 86 Also, unlike the dentist
81. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539, 544-45 (Hudson
County Ct. L. Div. 1967) (citations omitted). See also Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127
N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974), where the court stated:
If it is otherwise determined that the basic policy considerations which lead to the
application of the doctrine of strict liability are here present, that doctrine will
be applied regardless of whether such activity by either defendant [doctor or
hospital] be characterized as a sale or a service.
317 A.2d at 394. The court found, however, that the defendant hospital was not
liable because the blood transfusion (containing nearly undetectable serum hepatitis)
was an unavoidably unsafe product. Id. at 397.
82. See note 72 supra. See also Farnsworth, Inplied Warranties of Quality in
Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653, 663-65 (1957); Note, Products and the
Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HAST. L. REv.
1 11, 120, 124-25 (1972).
83. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (beauty parlor
operator applied a permanent wave solution which injured the plaintiff, for which
the court permitted recovery from the beauty parlor).
84. 258 A.2d at 701-02. The court said:
The transaction, in our judgment, is a hybrid partaking of incidents of a sale
and a service. It is really partly the rendering of service, and partly the supplying
of goods for a consideration. . . . The no-separate-charge argument puts ex-
cessive emphasis on form and downgrades the overall substance of the trans-
action.
Id. at 701. See notes 70 & 72 and accompanying text supra.
85. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO THE HEALTH CARE FIELD 151
(1975 ed.).
86. Calabresi and Hirschoff offer a slightly different test for distributing the risk.
They would have the courts impose liability upon "the cheapest cost avoider," that
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in Magrine, St. James Hospital knows who manufactured and distrib-
uted the rongeur. Both of these parties were joined in the action.
Therefore, St. James could shift liability to one of the other two de-
fendants if it could show the instrument was defective when received. 87
St. James could not avoid strict liability by claiming the rongeur
was unavoidably unsafe. 88 A rongeur is capable of "being made safe
for its intended and ordinary use."' 89 However, if the hospital can
party who "is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident
costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made."
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. 1055,
1060 (1972) (emphasis in original).
If one phrases the issue as Calabresi and Hirschoff do-"not whether avoidance is
worth it, but which of the parties is relatively more likely to find out whether avoid-
ance is worth it"---it is apparent that the hospital would be the cheapest cost avoider.
Id. at 1060-61. It certainly possesses greater knowledge than the patient of the in-
juries which could result from the use of defective surgical instruments. Likewise, it
will know more about alternative inspection techniques and the expense of discover-
ing such defects.
As long as the defect is not one of design, the hospital should be a cheaper cost
avoider than the manufacturer or distributor. Neither of these two parties can inspect
for defects which develop after the instrument leaves their hands. Finally, the hos-
pital's opportunities for discovering the defects exceed those of the surgeon. Hospital
personnel handle the equipment more frequently and observe its use in more oper-
ations. The surgeon is trained to provide medical services; it would be a waste of his
skill and resources to require that he inspect for defects in the equipment which the
hospital provides.
87. The hospital will have more difficulty shifting liability when the instrument is
a reusable product than when it is disposable and designed for a single use. Many
disposable medical products are pre-sterilized and packaged by the manufacturer to
enhance the convenience of using the product. When the instrument is pre-sterilized
the hospital cannot be expected to contaminate it by carefully inspecting it for defects.
Yet, arguably, the hospital's position should be no different from that of the retail
dealer who sells food in a sealed container but is nevertheless liable for defects.
Sofman v. Denham Food Service, Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168 (1962). The hos-
pital should, however, have more success at showing that the instrument was defec-
tive when received. An instrument which is used once, and breaks during that single
use, carries a strong inference that it was defective when received. The inference is
supported by the requirement that such products be stored and handled carefully.
88. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d
897, 903-04 (1970) (hepatitis-infected blood transfusion is not unavoidably unsafe
and the transfuser was, therefore, not immune from a strict liability action). But see
Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 NJ. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974)
(criticizing Cunningham and finding a similar transfusion to be an unavoidably unsafe
product).
89. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k
(1965):
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These
are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vac-
cine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very
serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vac-
cine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which
they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
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show that Dr. Somberg used the rongeur abnormally or otherwise
knew the rongeur was weakened and proceeded to use it, Dr. Som-
berg's negligence should relieve the hospital from liability. 90
IV. CONCLUSION
Imposing a duty on multiple medical defendants to exculpate them-
selves retains the benefits of the res ipsa rationale without its attendant
procedural and analytical confusion. In addition, extending strict lia-
bility theory to hospitals has several advantages over the Anderson
holding. It would promote predictability of results and permit the par-
ties to modify their behavior in order to improve medical care and
avoid liability. The joinder of all possible defendants would not be
necessary, nor would the hospital be precluded from seeking contribu-
tion or indemnity from an unjoined defendant. Finally, extending
strict liability to the hospital would preserve the integrity of the strict
liability and negligence theories and avoid the conflict and theoretical
uncertainty inherent in the instruction that "at least one defendant
must be found liable" when negligence actions are involved.
John Ludlow
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Id. (emphasis in original).
90. There is some confusion as to whether a party's contributory negligence in
using a defective product insulates the manufacturer from liability in a strict liability
action. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769,
782 (1965). The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, accepts the distinction
espoused in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965):
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter
a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is
a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless pro-
ceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery.
Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 15, at 667-71 for a discussion of the difference
between abnormal use, contributory negligence which overlaps the defense of assump-
tion of the risk, and simple contributory negligence.
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